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ABSTRACT

If we engage in reflection on standards of critique, we are entering the terrain of metaethics, or the question of which ethical standards we should accept. The question is not only, in the sense of self-awareness, what we as individual researchers or as a critical discourse analysis community think or feel about a specific social phenomenon. The metaethical question is about what we *should* think or feel.

The aim of this article is to argue for a specific perspective on critique, namely, an immanent critique that takes social suffering as the starting point for discourse analysis. I will show that the suffering produced by human beings or suffering that could be abolished or alleviated by human beings must be behind every informed critique in CDS.

In a first step, I will present different sources of critique that can be found in CDS and argue in favor of the approach of immanent critique as a model for CDS (I). I will then develop a theory of social suffering that is sensitive to the enormous diversity of normative spheres and normative claims and that can be used as an anchor for critique (II). Finally, I will show how and when this type of critique becomes social critique, or a critique towards the fundamental structures of societies, and reconnect the approach presented here to the existing forms of critique in CDS (III).

If CDS wants to not only combine discourse analysis *and* critique but also to perform discourse analysis *as* critique, then CDS must more explicitly consider not only text and talk but also silent and silenced forms of suffering. As social suffering is a complex phenomenon that requires interdisciplinary approaches based in philosophy, politics, psychology and sociology, DA must broaden its methods towards empathic understanding, affective reactions, practices, and material dispositions.

If we understand critique as the act of evaluating and judging the merits and demerits of something, then we cannot help but ask what should count as merit or demerit. This is the question of valid standards that we can use for assessment. To evaluate and judge, we need certain norms or a normative standpoint to determine that something should or should not be a specific way. If we engage in reflection on these standards, we are entering the terrain of metaethics, or the question of which ethical (or, more generally speaking, normative) standards we should accept (in everyday life as well as in discourse analysis).

The question is not only, in the sense of self-awareness, what we as individual researchers or as a critical discourse analysis community think or feel about a specific social phenomenon. It is not only about knowing our ethical or normative position. The metaethical question is about what we *should* think or feel (see Stahl, 2013a). In other words, the question is about the 'correct' ethical position. Therefore, we must not only think about our subjective criteria but also about criteria that are objectively valid.

However, the question of normative judgement has been highly disputed in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). There is often open mistrust towards value judgements. Since Foucault, we know that every value, every truth claim, is a powerful instrument that hides its oppressive character behind the appearance of objectivity or normality. Nevertheless, there are authors who follow a particular position to perform critique. That is, they present their research as stemming from a specific 'attitude' (van Dijk, 2015, p. 466) or a specific 'political commitment' (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52). The problem is that in a plural society, there is an enormous diversity of rational attitudes and commitments that could be used as critical standpoints for discourse analysis. Moreover, there is the possibility that the standpoint of the critique may not be adequate to the object of critique. For example, a teapot made from chocolate could be rationally criticized for its lack of functionality as a recipient for hot beverages, but perhaps the 'real' or main function of the object is to serve as a decorative item or as an original source of chocolate rather than as a teapot. Therefore, the question is what the normative ground of critique is. Is there one normative ground, or are there as many grounds as objects of critique? Must the normative standpoint of critique come from the critic or from the object of critique? Does this normative perspective precede the analysis, or is it the result of a (discourse) analysis? As social scientists who describe reality, we encounter Hume's classical is-ought problem that says that we cannot derive a prescriptive affirmation (X ought to be) from a descriptive one (X is so and so). In this case, critique as prescriptive practice would never be the result of social analysis and would always be external to that analysis.

We could limit our approach of critique in relation to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), taking into account that when we speak about CDA we are speaking of 'real world problems'. That is, we are not speaking only of the symbolic or syntactic aspects of discourses but also about the relation of the discourses with the social world. In other words, in CDA, there are always human beings involved, and the focus in CDS is on those involvements that could be described as somehow problematic. Again, what should count as a social problem is highly disputed.

The aim of this article is to argue for a specific perspective on critique, namely, an immanent critique that takes social suffering as the starting point for discourse analysis. I will show that the suffering produced by human beings or suffering that could be abolished or alleviated by human beings must be behind every informed critique in CDS.

In a first step, I will present different sources of critique that can be found in CDS and argue in favor of the approach of immanent critique (Jaeggi, 2014a; Romero, 2014; Stahl, 2013c) as a model for CDS (I). I will then develop a theory of social suffering that is sensitive to the enormous diversity of normative spheres and normative claims and that can be used as an anchor for critique (II). Finally, I will show how and when this type of critique becomes social critique, or a critique towards the fundamental structures of societies, and reconnect the approach presented here to the existing forms of critique in CDS (III).

1. The place of critique in discourse analysis

In discourse analysis, we can find several approaches to critique. In what follows, I would like to differentiate five models of critique that are ultimately part of what I call external critique and confront them with the model of immanent critique. The type of critique is often implicit in discourse analysis, whereas in other cases these models are openly defended by the respective authors.

1.1. Five versions of external critique

The first model of critique is often called internal critique (see also Herzog, 2016a, 2016b). It consists of pointing towards internal incoherencies, such as when we are confronted with a racist discourse in which the same speaker or the same discourse affirms that migrants take our jobs and claims that migrants come to our countries to live off our social aid and welfare state. This type of critique of a specific argumentation is ultimately based on the external norm of coherence. Therefore, we can also understand this type of critique as a form of external critique. The problems here are twofold. On the one hand, this model would not allow us to criticize a *coherent* racist discourse; on the other hand, we could cast doubt on the external norm of coherence. At least since the election of Donald Trump, we must ask ourselves whether all discourses point towards a certain coherence or whether incoherent discourses can be used quite consciously to mobilize affects. A critique of incoherence in this case would only provoke a shrug by those criticized.

The second model of external critique directly and often openly refers to external norms. This is the model as it is presented in the most prominent works of CDA authors. For example, Van Dijk (2009) defends a position that is based on international human rights. Van Dijk is well aware of the particularity of this position when he warns that 'such norms and rights change historically and that some definitions of "international" may well mean "Western"' (ibid, p. 62). However, although van Dijk is aware of the particularity and, perhaps, of the inappropriateness of a certain group of external norms, he seems to have no choice but to insist on these norms. Norman Fairclough's critical perspective is based on the view that 'asymmetrical relations of power, to domination' (Fairclough, 1995, p. 73) and, especially, to relations of 'of class, gender, cultural group, and so forth' (1992, p. 91) must be criticized. However, this perspective seems to be grounded in a well-argued personal position. This grounding of critique in the researcher's perspective is also present in the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as defended by Reisigl and Wodak. Here, too, the definition of social problems depends on the normative-ethical perspective of the analyst (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 32). The problem is that there are several rational approaches and bundle of norms that we can legitimately use for critique but that may contradict each other.

The third variant of external critique is procedural critique. In political philosophy, the most common example of procedural critique is that of Rawls (1999). In discourse studies, Habermas (1984) approach is more widely known. Procedural critique states that an affirmation, a practice or a social order should be rejected when it is not the result of or is incompatible with a specific hypothetical or real procedure. This procedure may be the result of a non-coercive negotiation between all persons affected (Habermas) or the famous hypothetical veil of ignorance (Rawls). This time, the problem is not about possibly contradictory external norms but about rational disagreement about the procedures

applied. There seem to be several rational procedures, and each procedure seems to already imply the acceptance of a certain normative bundle.

In Discourse Analysis (DA), we can also find approaches that understand their position not explicitly as critical but as descriptive. These approaches attempt to offer 'objective' descriptions to policy makers and civil society so that these actors can use research findings to develop political action in an informed way. Although authors who follow this line are not critical themselves, at the moment when research is used to say that something should or should not be a specific way, it engages in critique. Again, critique here is external to the object of critique. The normative position from which an object is criticized lies in the eyes of those who use the outcome of the descriptive research. In this case, these are not the researchers but the policy makers and agents of civil society.

The final version of external critique is that of critical genealogy, which is prominently present in the work of Foucault (e.g. Foucault, 2007; see also Butler, 2001) and many other discourse researchers inspired by the Foucaultian approach. Here, an object is described in such a way that the contingencies of its social (i.e. discursive) production are emphasized. The intended effect is that of denaturalizing social categories and providing the first step in empowering people to critically relate or rebuild these categories. In other words, the idea is that people should be able to take the discursive production of reality into their own hands. However, no matter how sympathetic one may be to this approach, it also relies on an external norm: the norm of freedom, the freedom to discursively construct realities. Here, again, we could think of reasonable disagreement to this normative stance, such as when freedom becomes an imposition and a means of shifting social responsibilities, especially in what is known lately as neoliberalism (see also Reitz, 2003).

1.2. Immanent critique

The model of critique for which I argue in this article is a critique that orients its standards towards the object of critique and that is internationally known as immanent critique (Jaeggi, 2014a; Romero, 2014; Stahl, 2013c). Immanent critique takes its normative stance from the criticized object itself without maintaining an uncritical affirmation. The model, also described as innerworldly transcendence (Fink-Eitel, 1993) or immanent transcendence (Honneth, 2000), combines immanence and transcendence with regard to norms and methods. Norms should be already – at least implicitly – accepted by the addressees of critique (immanence). At the same time, norms should point beyond the actual reality (transcendence). As a method, immanent critique should take its norms not from outside (e.g. the perspective of the researcher) but from the empirical, pre-scientific experiences of the people (immanence). At the same time, research should contribute to practical, social change (transcendence). This is the model of critique that can be found in the Left-Hegelian tradition, prominently in Marx and the post-Marxist Frankfurt School.

Nevertheless, there is the question of which norms are at least implicitly embedded in practices (see Stahl, 2013b) accepted by the addresses of critique. This is the question of which pre-scientific, empirical, moral experiences the critic rely upon. In most cases where we have a competent speaker, we could just ask and then conduct a discourse analysis of the speaker's explicit normative claims and relate these claims to his or her practices. Critique would then have the basic form, 'If you accept that, as you said, X is a valid normative point of view for you, then, consequently, you have to do Y'. However, in the case of

critique of impersonal structures, such as critique of capitalism (see, e.g. Jaeggi, 2014b) or, more generally speaking, in the case of social critique, it is not clear on which empirical, pre-scientific experiences we can rely for our critique. In other words, when we do not criticize individual or collective practices but rather social reality or social order, then we cannot just ask this reality about its implicit normative claims.

On this issue, different authors have offered quite different solutions. For Marx, it was the social experience of work and, hence, the working class that could be used as a normative starting point for critique. Through work, the workers relate to each other, to society and to the material reality in a specific way and develop certain normative claims that cannot be met by the given capitalist society. This was also the basic line of argument at the beginning of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. However, Auschwitz made it seemingly impossible to follow the idea that work and the working class are in a privileged position to develop normative and practical critique. Not only did the working class integrate itself without excessive friction into the national-socialist movement, but it was the very rational knowledge stemming from work that made possible the Holocaust, the rational and industrial organization of barbarity.

It was Habermas who reconceptualized immanent critique with his Theory of Communicative Action (1984). For Habermas, it is not work but language and its use that provide the pre-scientific anchor for critique: 'Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech' (Habermas, 1984, p. 287). In other words, with the use of language, a competent speaker already accepts certain validity claims that can be understood by the researcher and that ultimately point towards understanding as a form of emancipation. For critical discourse researchers, the problematic aspects of Habermas' argumentation should be quite familiar. Especially since Foucault, we know that language and its use is not a neutral means of communication but that there is a powerful 'order of discourse' (Foucault, 1981) that embeds every speech act in a game or struggle of power and knowledge. Language is always already part of a regime of power and knowledge that prefigures what the participants can want, do or express. Parts of these power regimes are also the entry requirements to participate in (public) discourses. Not everyone has the cultural and educational capital necessary to present his or her own position as a rational argument.

This critique of power regimes and undemocratic limitations of participation represent the background for Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition (Honneth, 1992). Honneth follows the line of communicative action of his master Habermas, but instead of focusing on speech acts, he follows affective reactions to misrecognition. These affective reactions, for Honneth, form the pre-scientific, empirical and moral anchor for grounding immanent critique. They overcome the democratic deficit of Habermas' speech act as everyone can suffer from misrecognition independent of his or her capacity to express this reaction in a public debate or to turn it into a positive social theory of recognition. Affective reactions are pre-linguistic, emotional responses that usually have a bodily and an expressive dimension. For Honneth, affective reactions to misrecognition, as the opposite of recognition, point towards the aim of recognition in terms of emancipation. What is important here is that Marx, Habermas and Honneth use their normative anchors not to criticize workers, competent speakers or those who suffer from misrecognition but as a normative starting point to develop a critique of broader social constellations.

For empirical research, it is now relevant to understand that affective reactions cannot always be expressed in linguistic terms. For discourse analysis, this means that researchers

must take into account non-linguistic elements. The more the participants are excluded from the cultural capital that can facilitate the expression of their feelings of misrecognition, the more researchers must analyse other 'meaningful and structured' elements (see also Herzog, 2016a, p. 147) that, similar to language, can produce an understanding of the situation. For example, whereas the misrecognition perceived by young academics could be researched by means of classical DA due to these academics' relatively high capacity to express themselves, research focusing on groups that are traditionally excluded from the hegemonic discourse production must turn its attention towards other elements.

Since the new millennium, DA has seen the rise of several more sociological approaches that *systematically* combine the analysis of language with research on practices, material dispositions, and affective reactions. I am referring here to the Sociology of Knowledge Approach towards Discourses – SKAD (Keller, 2005), the Dispositif Analysis (Bührmann & Schneider, 2007), Discourse Analysis 'after structuralism' (Angermuller, 2014), ethnographic discourse analysis (e.g. Macgilchrist & van Hout, 2011) and others that have emerged in the last decades. These approaches can help us to overcome the sociological deficit of approaches that focus mainly on speech acts and do not take into account the silent and silenced form of misrecognition.

2. Social suffering

Before conducting research, we should ask whether 'affective reactions to misrecognition' really hold as an anchor of immanent critique. In what follows, I would like to understand these affective reactions as social suffering. Social suffering here is the suffering that occurs when certain norms are not fulfilled in a specific situation or when these norms are only partially met (i.e. are not fully realized in a given society). In other words, social suffering is the suffering that comes from the difference between normative claims and the reality of these claims being fully or partially disregarded. Social suffering therefore describes a somehow physical (i.e. empirical) reaction to misrecognition. It is pre-scientific and even pre-rational. This pre-rationality requires a theoretical approach with regard to the very nature of social experiences if we want to use them as a moral compass (see also Renault, 2010). Using social suffering as an anchor point for critique is therefore only possible if we do not use only the physical reaction but also understand social suffering as a second-order phenomenon that must be differentiated from first-order phenomena.

These first-order phenomena can be first-order suffering or other phenomena that do not necessarily have to be perceived in terms of suffering. Examples of first-order suffering include a human being in Africa who suffers from famine, a boxer who receives a punch during a boxing match or a person who bangs his head against the cupboard. Examples of other first-order phenomena include someone not being greeted on the street by an acquaintance, someone working a standard working day and performing care work afterwards at home, or someone sharing public transport with people of another skin color.

Social suffering, as second-order suffering or suffering from disrespect, depends on how a specific first-order phenomenon is perceived. The immanent critique of social suffering refers only to the difference between claims and reality. To be subject to critique, a phenomenon must fulfil several criteria that must be analysed by the researcher:.

First, we must ask whether a phenomenon is social or natural. There are no normative claims regarding natural phenomena. Of course, we can complain about our mortality or about the bad weather, but we cannot criticize these phenomena; they are not creating misrecognition. Only phenomena that are socially produced, socially changeable or relievable can be possible candidates for critique. Only in these phenomena can we perhaps find misrecognition. For DA, it follows that we must show that certain phenomena are not natural but socially produced. In fact, discourse analysts are specialists in showing the discursive production of quite a wide range of social phenomena. In addition, during the course of history, the status of a phenomenon can change. So for example, famines, which have accompanied humanity throughout its entire history, only become criticisable at the moment when there is the social possibility to overcome these extreme types of food crisis. Under the contemporary condition of advanced modernity in which the industrial production of food theoretically can abolish food scarceness in the world, famine can be seen as a situation of massive misrecognition.

In a second step, discourse analysts must ask whether an observed phenomenon contradicts the normative expectations of the participants. In other words, DA must analyse the implicit and explicit normative claims of the participants. For our example of the boxer who is punched in the ring, this would mean that he perceives real, physical pain, but he does not feel disrespected. He expects his opponent to attempt to hit him as hard as he can. Furthermore, the refusal of the opponent to box would, in this case, constitute an example of misrecognition. Imagine a boxer who refuses to box against a Jewish or a black boxer. Only those social actions that contradict normative claims produce social suffering. This explains why there is no norm conflict in the case of suffering from bumping one's head into the cupboard. We have no normative claims towards the cupboard. This means that although we feel physical pain, we are not speaking here of social suffering as suffering from disrespect. For DA, the task is to make explicit the implicit normative expectations and so to contribute to the process of social self-understanding and self-awareness. As noted previously, in the case of a highly competent speaker, classical discourse analysis of explicit and implicit normative expectations should work quite well. In a case in which there is less communicative competence, more sociological approaches, including the analysis of other communicative elements, should be considered.

Nevertheless, in the case of normative expectations, two problems may arise that are related to what we can call an ideology of recognition (see also Honneth, 2004) and an ideology of disrespect. The ideology of recognition refers to a situation in which we should expect suffering but this suffering is not noticed or is rationalized by something like a 'false consciousness'. Take the example of a woman who, after a standard working day, must perform more care work at home than her husband. Instead of suffering due to this inequality, she could rationalize the situation with a specific 'mother ideology'. She could even feel comforted due to her dedication to her family. The opposite of the ideology of recognition is the ideology of disrespect. For example, we could easily understand a white supremacist suffering from the fact that he has to share public transport with people of other races. His normative claim would be that whites should enjoy privileged treatment in the public sphere. As there is a gap between this claim and reality, the white supremacist would suffer from this situation. Again, speaking of an ideology here refers to something like a false consciousness of the white supremacist.

The question of false consciousness, and especially politics in the name of this notion of ideology, is very much questioned in social science and requires explanation (see also Herzog, 2018). These examples have shown that social suffering as a second-order phenomenon is not an original, authentic or natural starting point but is always related to the normative framework that is socially accepted in a specific socio-historical setting. This also means that although we are speaking of suffering as a pre-scientific, empirical, moral anchor for critique, social suffering is not pre-social or pre-discursive. It is embedded in a social world of the social (discursive) construction of normative claims.

As social researchers, first, we are not in the privileged position to differentiate ideological from non-ideological forms of suffering. Moreover, we could even understand this suffering. We are able to empathically comprehend that it must be psychologically painful to be convinced of the right to privileged treatment and then to be treated as an equal, as in the case of the white supremacist. Thus, we have no privileged starting point in the form of specific social suffering and – at least initially – must treat every suffering as equal. What social research in general and DA in particular can do is a) to expose the underlying implicit and explicit norms that are at stake in a case of suffering and b) to show the consequences of one or the other forms of the abolition of suffering. For our case of the white supremacist, we could show that abolishing the suffering of the white supremacist by establishing a form of apartheid would only produce more suffering, whereas abolishing his suffering through re-education and re-socialization would end his suffering without creating more suffering elsewhere.

We could proceed in a similar way if we encounter a lack of suffering where we would expect to find affective reactions to misrecognition. In the case of ideological forms of not suffering, as discourse analysts, we can show how the social situation and the interpretation of the situation are discursively constructed; that is, we contribute to the awareness that specific social constellations, norms, roles, and hierarchies are not natural or inevitable but are socially contingent and discursively produced in a specific way. Equally, and contributing to social self-awareness, through sociological discourse analysis (i.e. taking into account the meaningful character not only of words but also of practices and material dispositions), we can show the explicit and implicit normative ground of those involved in social interaction. By doing so, it is possible that we can show that, after all, there is a normative contradiction. Thus, we make the subjects involved feel their chains. This is classical sociological enlightenment.

Suffering thus combines philosophical approaches with individual, psychological dimensions of affective reactions, sociological analysis and a political perspective. Suffering here is seen as the driving engine for critique and social change. 'The physical moment tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be different. "Woe speaks: Go"' (Adorno, 1990, p. 203). If I present the avoidance of suffering as a universal and superior norm that can be used to evaluate social reality and all other norms, we should be aware of the ontological and epistemological status of this norm. It is not that we replace one external norm, such as freedom, equality, or autonomy, with the new external norm that suffering should not be. By understanding the avoidance of suffering as the avoidance of misrecognition, it becomes clear that second-order suffering is not *one* norm but rather a *multiplicity* of *historically changing* norms and the suffering produced when these norms are not realized. In different social settings, we can find a diversity of normative claims of

the very actors in these settings and the (implicit) claim to not want to suffer from the discrepancy between these claims and the social reality.

However, with this approach, we must also be aware of the limits of immanent critique. Immanent critique has lost its cause when all participants are satisfied with the situation and when no suffering, not even displaced suffering, exists. If, in this case, we criticized social organization, we would only be external critics, unable to ground our critique in normative contradictions of the subjects involved. This could occur on two occasions: in the ideal society in which all normative contradictions are sublated or, as seems more likely according to some immanent critics (e.g. Adorno, 1990), in the 'context of total delusion'.

To summarize the argument, we can say that an immanent critical approach to DA means that DA must show the normative claims that implicitly and explicitly exist in given social relations. It must create awareness of the norms that may be at stake and that may be threatened due to specific social practices. Whereas explicit normative claims do not require excessive effort, implicit normative claims may be quite difficult to find. Here, we broaden our discourse analytical approach towards the analysis of structured, meaningful elements that can be read and interpreted similar to linguistic expressions. It is the aim of this approach to show the underlying normative consensus and to make the participants aware of it. Furthermore, it is the task of this type of critique to show the normative conflicts of which participants are often unaware and to provide arguments for or against certain solutions to these conflicts. In the tradition of classical sociological enlightenment, DA as immanent critique (see Herzog, 2016a) provides information about the social unconscious and about the (unintended) consequences of social actions. DA as immanent critique would then mean informing about the normative grounds of our living together – no more, but also no less.

3. Conclusions – from suffering to social critique

I would like to go a step further. In the tradition of immanent critique, the difference between normative claims and reality is often not a coincidence. Here, we have intentionally used the term 'contradiction' to refer to this discrepancy. A contradiction in the tradition of immanent critique is not just an incongruency that can be easily abolished. For real, transcending immanent critique, the difference between claims and reality is necessary contradictions; that is, the social order itself is unable to provide an easy solution for the diverging of normative demands and social reality. With this turn, immanent critique becomes social critique. It becomes critique of the social order, critique of the way society reproduces itself and of the way it produces systematically unsolvable norm conflicts.[1]

For discourse analysis, this final turn means that DA must not only show the difference between (implicit) normative claims and reality; it must also show the systematic or structural resistances that one encounters when attempting to realize normative claims. Critique, in the form of social critique, is less a unique act and more a process in which norms and normative expectancies change. To use a classical example, we could cite Marx, who started with the liberal, bourgeois idea of freedom. By showing how this freedom is only a limited idea of freedom understood as freedom of interchange products and even labor in the market, he did not exclude the idea of freedom. Instead, he used the very concept to criticize an entire system of production that ultimately produces the

opposite of freedom for the vast majority of the population. Furthermore, during the process of critique, both the norms and the interpretation of these norms that we use to criticize society change. Insofar as we identify with these norms, we, as critics, undergo a process of change.

We have seen how immanent critique presents a way of grounding, or anchoring (as a metaphor that better captures the temporal character), the perspective that we use to criticize a specific phenomenon. The normative standpoint is not in the eye of the critic but in the objects of critique itself. Immanent critique therefore contributes to the self-consciousness of society (i.e. to awareness about the normative basis of living together). At the same time, immanent critique as presented here attempts to offer discourse analysts self-awareness about possible critical stances.

With this approach to immanent critique, we not only meet the criterion of immanence as a normative and methodological requirement but also point to the transcending character of critique. The norms we refer to are already accepted, at least implicitly, in society, and we can observe them in the pre-scientific, moral experiences of suffering due to misrecognition. At the same time, these norms point towards a development, a process of change. Moreover, by making the already accepted normative ideas socially aware, social change is more likely to occur. It is more likely for individuals or social groups to be motivated by normative reasons they have already accepted (see Stahl, 2013a, p. 20). This approach helps to overcome Hume's classical is-ought problem. We are not describing through discourse analysis a reality that produces suffering and then, externally, claiming that this type of social construction of reality ought not to be. What we describe are the normative claims of the subjects involved and their superior norm to want to not suffer from the discrepancy between claims and reality. In other words, we are not describing only reality but society's own notion of the 'oughts'. What ought to be is not an external imposition but the description of what the social actors (at least implicitly) accept as normative ground.

Finally, I would like to forge a link between the more Hegelian approach of immanent critique and CDS. Although the approach presented here was developed in contrast to external forms of critique as found in the critical genealogy of Foucault or as presented with regard to van Dijk and Fairclough, the approach should not be understood as opposition to these forms of critique. We can even say that what motivates those authors is not a personal attitude detached from social reality and developed completely from theoretical readings but social suffering. In the form of genuine social suffering under existing social conditions or through empathy towards the suffering of more marginalized groups, the apparently 'external' perspective of CDS authors could also be the result of empathy towards social suffering that has not yet reached the level of reflection needed for immanent critique. Thus, the anchoring of immanent critique in social suffering may help CDS to understand the source of its own 'external', 'attitude' (van Dijk), 'political commitment' (Fairclough) or 'will not to be governed like this' (Foucault).

If CDS wants to not only combine discourse analysis *and* critique but also to perform discourse analysis *as* critique (regarding this distinction, see also Nonhoff, 2017), then CDS must more explicitly consider not only text and talk but also silent and silenced forms of suffering. As social suffering is a complex phenomenon that requires interdisciplinary approaches based in philosophy, politics, psychology and sociology, DA must broaden its methods towards empathic understanding, affective reactions, practices,

and material dispositions. Only with this broadened, self-conscious approach can we over-come CDS as a tool for our critical standpoint prior to the analysis and turn CDS into a genuine critical approach.

Note

1. However, it is also possible that the difference between claims and reality is a mere coincidence and a surface phenomenon that can be easily abolished. In this case, we would speak of affirmative immanent critique and not of real, transcending critique (see also Herzog, 2016b).

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Benno Herzog is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Valencia, Spain. He has worked and conducted research in Germany (Universities of Frankfurt and Mainz), the United Kingdom (University of Manchester, Open University, and University of Warwick), and Brazil (Federal University of Paraíba). His research focuses on social critique and critical theory of society, discourse theory and discourse analysis, and migration and discrimination.

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